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The lack of first principles linking organizational theory
and empirical evidence puts the future of autonomous
multi-agent  system  (MAS)  missions  and  their
interactions with humans at risk.  Characterizing this
issue  as  N  increases  are  the  significant  trade-offs
between  costs  and  computational  power  to  interact
among agents and humans. In contrast to the extreme of
command or consensus decision-making approaches to
manage these tradeoffs, quantizing the pro-con positions
in  decision-making  may  produce  a  robust  model  of
interaction  that  better  integrates  social  theory  with
experiment and increases computational power with N.
We have found that optimum solutions of ill-defined
problems  (idp’s)  occurred  when  incommensurable
beliefs  interacting  before  neutral  decision  makers
generated sufficient emotion to process information, I,
but insufficient to impair the interaction, unexpectedly
producing more trust than under the game-theory model
of  cooperation.  We  have  extended  our  model  to  a
mathematical  theory  of  organizations,  especially
mergers; and we introduce random exploration into our
model  with  the  goal  of  revising  rational  theory  to
achieve autonomy with an MAS.
Introduction
The major unsolved problem in social interaction, and a
threat  to  autonomy  for  future  MAS  missions,  is  the
inability  to  distinguish  disaggregated  groups  from
functioning groups (Allport, 1962). This problem resists
solution  primarily  because  theories  of  the  social
interaction have until now been based on the individual
rational perspective; e.g., in game theory (Luce & Raiffa,
1967), the choice to cooperate or compete with opponents
over  a  set  of  independent  choices  that  maximizes
individual utility. In contrast, we have made progress on a
mathematics  of  social  interaction  with  Bohr’s  (1955)
conjugate  factors  of  action  uncertainty  (∆a)  and
observation uncertainty (∆I) for a group constrained to
process  the  I  generated  by  opponents  entangled  with
neutral decision-makers (Lawless & Castelao, 2001). We
have  since  made  extensions  to  argument  (Lawless  &
Schwartz, 2002) and organizational theory (Lawless &
Grayson, 2004).
In  the  former  case,  we  associated  quantum-like
square  energy,  E,  wells  with  emotion  (measured  by
arousal or temperature, T = ∂E/∂I) and decision-making
(e.g.,  Lawless,  2001).  We  had  found  that  interaction
cross-sections, σAB, are related to vocal frequencies, ω,
leading to the speculation that cross-sections apply to
brain waves: if brain gamma waves (≈ 40 Hz) mediate the
binding of sensory features into objects (Engel et al.,
1999)  or  concepts  (Lawless  &  Chandrasekara, 2002),
transitions between opposing views in an argument rotate
a difficult concept to allow neutrals to grasp, “adjust”, and
apply it to solve an idp, linking solution “detection” to
signal detection (for a review of rotations, see Trafton &
Hoffman, in press; to review the quantum model as a
satisfactory  alternative  to  signal  detection  theory,  see
Luce,  1997).  As  opposed  to  the  simple  reinforcement
learning of neural nets, rotations are driven by dissonance
when  learning  difficult  concepts  (e.g.,  derivative  and
integral  calculus);  rotations  help  decision-makers
determine whether an argument can be defended “against
all contestations” (McBurney & Parsons, 2001, p. 76);
and the time, t, to rotate a concept measures complexity or
decision style, linking “adjustments” and “rotations” in
quantum game theory to organization perturbations as the
primary method humans use to gain I about organizations
(t = exp(N∆V), with ∆V as the change in potential E to
overcome  barriers  to  a  decision;  e.g.,  Lawless,  2004,
found that to make environmental decisions, consensus
seeking  imposes  significantly  greater  barriers  than
majority rule).
Second, organizations grow with recruits or merge
with other organizations when their joint E combines into
a lower ground state; bonding increases between recruits
and  leaders  as  vocal  frequencies  converge  (with





that increases the interaction rate, ΓP = nAnB a σAB exp (-
∆A/kBT)); Lawless & Grayson, 2004); interaction successdepends directly on the size of its cross-section; and the
likelihood of an interaction or merger varies inversely
with the free E, ∆A, required.
Control of the social interaction is fundamental to
MAS autonomy. Currently, a staff of 20 humans operates
a single Predator drone during its 18 hrs aloft, yet the
crash rate is 100 Predators to one piloted USAF aircraft
(e.g., Pfister, 2002). To reverse this relationship between
staff and artificial agents for a future military of Tactical
Autonomous  Combatants  (Moseley,  2003),  or  to  link
single robots like Predator into a computational system of
teams  (Darpa,  2002),  requires  the  rational  control  of
social interaction. Determining the optimum structure for
efficient  decision-making  or  the  formation  of
organizations  offers  the  greatest  opportunity  for
advancements  in  computational  agent  technology.
However, by not including shifts from individual to group
perspectives, the social interaction has until now remained
an  unsolved  problem  (Levine  &  Moreland,  1998).  As
such, Luce and Raiffa (1967, p. 196) concluded that the
rational logic of game theory was unable to resolve the
social  interaction.  Yet  game  theory  still  promotes  the
illusion that a rational decision reflecting consensus is
better  than  the  competitive  decisions  made  in  a
democracy (Benardete, 2002).
Axtell  (2002)  questioned  whether  the  orders  of
magnitude  separating  the  atomic  and  social  levels
precluded  applying  quantum  theory  to  the  social
interaction. Our quantum perturbation model (QPM) is
not meant to copy reality. In the sense that the figurative
atom  of  the  model  constructed  by  quantum  physicists
permits  predictions  to  be  calculated  and  validated,  it
matters less whether QPM is social reality than whether it
leads to new discoveries that can be validated such as the
control of MAS’s.
Several  reasons  exist  to  use  quantum  (conjugate)
mathematics.  First,  the  brain  acts  as  a  quantum
information processor, converting photons into I (French
&  Taylor,  1978),  including  illusions.  Second,  by
comparing  the  continuous  model  of  traditional  signal
detection  theory  (i.e.,  ROC  curves),  Luce  (1997)
concluded that the Bèkèsy-Stevens quanta model, based
on  detecting  discrete  stimulus  differences  from
background for one physical dimension such as E or ω
was a satisfactory alternative. Third, we have proposed:
∆a∆I > c (1)
∆E∆t > c (2)
with ∆E as energy and ∆t as time uncertainty (Lawless et
al., 2000). Equations (1) and (2) are equivalent. Based on
the Penrose-Hameroff model (Hagan et al., 2002), if I
from across the brain can be modeled as a single unit, and
if c is Planck’s constant, h, then ∆E∆t = ∆(h ω/2 )∆t >
h/2  reduces to ∆ω∆t > 1. Choosing ω as gamma waves
associated with object awareness at about 40 Hz gives ∆t
of 25 ms, a reasonable minimum (Crick & Koch, 1998).
Finally, the inability to validate game theory has already
encouraged  the  development  of  quantum  game  theory
(e.g., Eisert et al., 1999).
But  like  its  classical  counterpart,  quantum  game
theory assumes better social welfare from cooperation.
However, game theory implements this “higher” value
with coercion (Axelrod, 1984), a necessary requirement
per Hardin (1968). In effect competition is used in the
traditional  view  to  forcibly  squelch  dissent  and  drive
sequential I  transfer. To contrast this view with QPM,
cooperation  among  neutral  agents  is  maximized  when
agent operators compete fiercely to win, but with conflict
moderated by neutrals (Kirk, 2003), as a consequence
driving neutral agents into a special state of cooperation
known  as  superposition  (characterized  by  the  lowest
entropy state possible among agents) to randomly explore
the landscape of alternative solutions.
The key contribution from QGT is its portrayal of
two  or  more  agents  in  an  interaction  becoming
“entangled”,  meaning  their  coordination  surpasses
correlated  game  behavior  to  somehow  achieve  “non-
local” coordination without communication (Arfi, 2003).
Entanglement  allows  participants  an  infinity  of
“adjustments”  that  transform  the  game  theory  given
matrix of values to become what Kelley (1992) called an
unknowable, unpredictable “effective” matrix, what we
call rotations. From our research, rotations into solutions
increase with N, a crucial link to mathematical biology
and control theory (where N is the number of Fourier
components; in May, 2001, p. 172).
In  the  traditional  view  of  human  or  agent
computations, computations can occur in parallel, but I
shared sequentially among agents or broadcasted from a
central command point slows the computational process.
In this view, evolution occurs (e.g., genetic algorithms)
from  the  random  transfer  of  I,  generally  by  agent
reproduction and within the constraints of a well-defined
problem (wdp). In contrast, Feynman (1996) showed that
quantum-mechanical states could evolve from the action
of  operators.  And  Deutsch  (1989)  showed  that  a
superposition  of  quantum  states  could  be  explored
simultaneously,  producing  parallel  computations  more
powerful than digital ones.
Three traditional computational agents exist in three
of eight possible dual states. To explore randomly these
eight group states, a traditional parallel model of an MAS
would  probe  each  of  the  possible  group  states
sequentially. In contrast, three human agents (or three
quantum qubits) exist in 2
3 or eight states simultaneously,
and can be probed at once. Further, traditional agents do
not  rely  on  emotion  per  se.  But  human  and  quantum
agents exist in ground and excited states. To extend thisanalogy to a quantum agent model of an organization
(Lawless & Grayson, 2004), we propose that aspects of a
quantum  agent  organization  or  system  are  in  a
superposition of ground and excited states. In our view,
organization operators drive superposed neutrals across a
system’s fitness landscape.
In traditional computers, one bit represents 0 or 1.
Traditional parallel computation increases computational
power but with an exponential increase in processors and
physical space (i.e., n x n = n
2). In contrast, a single qubit
is in a superposition of 0 and 1. A register of N qubits is
in  a  superposition  of  all  2
N  possible  values
simultaneously, meaning that with quantum information
processing,  an  exponential  increase  in  computational
power requires only a linear increase in agent processors.
With |↑> representing the “pro” proposition and |↓> the
“con” opposition, a single basis state can be represented
as  |Ψ>  = a|↓>  +  b|↑>, where a  and  b  are  complex
numbers and |a|
2 + |b|
2 = 1. Parallelization for two qubits,
each with the same single basis state, can be symbolized
as  {|↓↓>, |↓↑>,  |↑↓>, |↑↑>}. Given a non-entangled,
decomposable combination of |Ψ1> and |Ψ2> as a1b1|↓↓>
+  a1b2|↓↑> + a2b1|↑↓> + a2b2|↑↑>, an entangled, non-
decomposable state is a1b1|↓↓> + a2b2|↑↑>; this entangled
state  has  no  classical  analog,  exists  in  a  low  state  of
entropy, and accounts for the measurement problem.
By collapsing into individual histories that cannot
recreate the interaction, the measurement problem at the
human level is analogous to the atomic level. It alone
justifies the quantum model for the social interaction and
social organization. Social interaction theory with humans
from  measuring  or  polling  members  forces  group
members to respond as individuals, but then summing
individual data does not reconstitute the group (Levine &
Moreland, 1998; also, Zeilinger, 1999). For example, a
survey in 1991 (Slovic et al., 2001, pp. 102-3) led to the
prediction  that  the  negative  images  associated  with  a
nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain would harm
the Las Vegas economy by reducing tourism; but even
after defending their original conclusion, ten years later
the authors admitted that tourism continued to make Las
Vegas  the  fastest  growing  community  in  the  U.S.  To
avoid  this  individual  “rational”  bias  in  bargaining
situations,  Nash  (1950)  assigned  zero  social  value  to
groups with dissent. But even for stable, homogeneous,
dissent-free groups, Lewin (1951) famously recognized
that a group is different from the sum of its parts; to
reiterate, surveys of members do not reconstitute a group
(Levine & Moreland, 1998).
Work-in-Progress. Perturbation theory
The  advantages  of  joining  a  group  are  reduced  E
expenditures in exchange for membership: social loafing
(Latane,  1981);  enhanced  skills  from  audience  effects
(Zajonc,  1998);  better  health  from  greater  interaction
density (House et al., 1988) and protected belief systems
(Rosenblatt et al., 1990). In exchange, a group exploits
the E and skills it collects (Ambrose, 2001), forming an
interaction structure around a network of valued roles
(Sallach,  2002).  Generally  at  the  lowest  E  state
(resonance), stable exchanges among agents cycle I back
and  forth  in  interactions  coordinated  by  common
knowledge, K  (Wendt,  1999).  Within  a  system  some
groups gain more E than it costs to survive (Coase, 1937),
this free energy, ∆A, allowing them to grow in size or
merge, gain experience or wealth, and deepen E wells to
process  more  I,  while  other  groups  merge  to  offset
competitive weaknesses (e.g., the inability to enact phone
number portability that let customers switch carriers while
keeping their phone numbers has made AT&T Wireless a
merger target in 2004).
Most interactions within a stable organization are
rational (solving a well-defined problem, or wdp), but
solving an idp is different (Equations 1 and 2). These
interactions temporarily shift members from ground into
excited states, where ∆t is the time for an organization to
evolve  from  its  stable  cultural  perspective  to  an
orthogonal  one  (“rotations”)  to  reach  a  decision
(Aharonov  &  Bohm,  1961).  For  optimal  decisions,
dissonance  between  polar  opposite  views  processes  I
uncertainty into K (e.g., political, legal, and scientific
dissonance usually precede optimal decisions; in Lawless
& Castelao, 2001). Analogous to signal detection, the
time (∆t) to detect and adopt a solution to an idp lasts
until the solution signal is separated from social noise;
e.g., air-to-air combat, environmental cleanup, disaster
recovery,  or  weather  prediction.   However,  given  the
measurement problem with self-reports, a new approach
must be initiated to measure ground and excited E states
(emotion),  such  as  vocal  energy  changes,  to  contrast




Figure  1:  Picard’s  model  of  emotion  suggests  that  social
perturbations  caused  by  dissonant  I produce a spectrum of
emotional responses. Significant vocal E changes from normal
to angry speech have been confirmed for one subject (Lawless,
2001).IENDOGENOUS




IEXOGENOUS-Org 1 IEXOGENOUS-Org 1
IEXOGENOUS-Org 2
IDISSONANT
ORGANIZATION 2 ORGANIZATION 1
Linear stability analyses of bifurcations due to system
perturbations  from  dissonance  during  social  decision-
making appear possible. It should be possible to build a
model  of  a  system  where  Lyapounov  exponents
characterize  the  rate  of  divergence  between  choices
during argument (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989, pp. 254-5,
262-3).  Figure  2  illustrates  this  effect.  To  control
divergence, organizations solving wdp’s favor command
decision  (e.g.,  businesses,  government  agencies,
universities). But command driven organizations within
democracies  must  compete  to  survive,  becoming
significantly  influenced  by  the  public  (feedback),  and





New endogenous K =  
New defense strategies
New exogenous K =  
New attack strategies
Fig. 2. After a perturbation sufficient to elevate
an  organization  to  an  excited  state,  an
organization’s  goal  is  to  respond  with
endogenous feedback to dissonant I by creating
new  K   to  innovate,  merge  or  adopt  new
technology to defend itself (e.g., the 2004 offer
to merge with eMachines by Gateway to offset
its declining computer sales and better compete
with  Dell  and  H-P).  Conversely,  using
exogenous feedback, a competitor’s goal is to
devise innovations, strategies or technologies to
defeat the organization. In general, the more efficient, quicker
respondent determines which organization wins and evolves
(Chagnon, 1988); e.g., in 2003 in the war with Iraq, coalition
decision-making  and  implementation  of  those  decisions
occurred faster than Iraq’s Defense Forces, causing the latter to
panic  (i.e.,  in  engineering  control  theory  late  feedback  is
destabilizing; in May, 2001,  p. 5).
From  the  implications  of  Fig.  2  (Lawless  &
Grayson, 2004), we offer a revision to game and quantum
game theory (Fig. 3). Unlike cooperation, competition in
a democracy occurs within a social milieu that provides
feedback to competitors. In contrast to game or quantum
game theory, competition significantly improves social
welfare; e.g., Southwest Airlines in 2004 shifted from
asymmetric  competition  to  a  frontal  assault  in
Philadelphia  that  could  defeat  already  weakened  U.S.
Airways, but as a consequence, significantly reducing air
fares  in  the  Northeast  (Rust,  2004);  Coleman  (2004)
found that polarizing attack ads help citizens gain a better
grasp of issues without a loss of trust; and Lawless and
colleagues  (Lawless  et  al.,  2000)  have  found  in
associations that the more competitive a nation, the more
scientific wealth it had, the better the physical health of its
citizens, and the less corruption in it.
Fig. 3. A revised model of game and quantum game theory. The
interdependent flow of dissonant I between Organizations 1 and
2 produces observational uncertainties (∆I) of competitors (e.g.,
faulty communication, misunderstanding, deception, bluffing, or
illusion). Perfect resolution implies K, whether by duplicitous
(e.g., Department of Justice charges in 2003 against Boeing
www.usdoj.gov:80/criminal/cybercrime/branchCharge.htm) or
normal  means  (e.g.,  price  signals,  price  leadership,  forum
exchanges,  court  challenges,  patents,  financial  disclosures,
market analyses). But K obtained by driving ∆I to zero has
limits. Per Lewin (1951), how an organization behaves must
also be determined (i.e., ∆a). Specifically, an interdependence
exists between ∆a and ∆I that limits the K produced (i.e., from
Equations  (1)  and  (2),  ∆a∆I  ≈  c  ≈  ∆E∆t, indicating that
organization inertia is a key factor in strategy and adaptability to
perturbations;  Lawless  &  Grayson,  2004).  As  an  example,
Robert  Hutchings,  Chair,  National  Intelligence  Council
(www.cia.gov/nic/speeches), noted that an underestimate by the
National Intelligence Estimate of Iraq weapons for the 1991 war
may have led to overestimates in the 2003 war. This illustration
also accounts for the mergers that arise from perturbations:
Should an organization’s execution of technology falter, as in
the case of AT&T Wireless in early 2004, it becomes the prey or
acquired organization instead of the predator. Unlike game and
quantum  game  theory,  power  accrues  to  the  winning
organization and its chief strategist; e.g., in 2003, Southwest
Airlines had twice the value of all six U.S. airlines larger than it
combined (ATA, 2002). Finally, from this figure, while social
feedback occurs when neutral members of the public form a
superposition  on  an  organizational  problem  sufficient  to
randomly explore the space of possible alternative solutions(like its relative choice of GM or Toyota cars), social feedback
has similar uncertainty limitations, motivating the reduction of
action and observation uncertainties with perturbations.
Mathematically, QPM offers the promise of a model
that bridges theory and empirical findings, while also
suggesting new areas to explore. Based on QPM, we see
these possible paths. First, argument entangles neutrals
with pro-con forces sufficient to drive neutrals to process
and choose a concept that solves an idp by converting I
into K, but insufficient to provoke violence, indirectly
promoting the value of limit cycles to manage an MAS in
contrast to command decision making (e.g., by managing
the  divergence  between  Lyapounov  exponents  with
feedback). Second, coupled Kolmogorov equations with
forcing functions indicate that stochastic resonance has
more potential to produce innovation in a democratically
governed  system  of  self-organized  groups  than  one
governed by an overarching command decision system
(i.e., dictatorship), but once an idp becomes a wdp, local
command organizations set within a democracy are more
efficient. Third, if the average distance between agents in
an MAS imply organizational wave length, λ, then the
more  cooperation  between  an  MAS  and  other  agents,
systems,  and  humans,  the  less  I  density  and  more
localized K  density  (beliefs)  that  occur;  the  converse
occurs  under  competition  or  other  perturbations—our
mathematics unexpectedly reproduce the well-established
finding that organizations under threat become physically
closer; i.e., a higher E from a threat reduces λ (where λ =
f(1/ω)). Finally, under stable environmental conditions,
the  diversity  and  competition  between  organizations
increase, generating evolution from choices; conversely,
environmental instability threatens diversity and survival,
consolidating markets and increasing predictability.
Work-in-progress. Research plan
Cohen and Axelrod (1998) recognized that strategy space
is  stochastic.  We  intend  to  incorporate  this  stochastic
reality into the validation of our model. The benefit of
entangling multiple independent actors is to collectively
reduce noise. The variance estimate of the unknown mean
is  reduced  by  a  factor  of  1/(√n)  as  the  number  of
independent assessments is increased, giving a sampling
distribution of the mean with variance/n. Since neutral
actors are independent but entangled in their assessments,
increasing the N of actors reduces the variance of the
unknown "mean" of the reality of an idp. We expect to
find  that entangled agents will be  in  a  lower  state of
variance than correlated agents who have lower variance
than the independent actors in game theory.
Second, we propose to test the concepts in Fig. 3
with an MAS model of the competition between an agent
model of GM, Toyota and all other car manufacturers (as
a group). GM and Toyota are operators, driving the car-
buying  public  of  neutrals  to  randomly  explore  the
alternative space of solutions by determining the optimum
choice of, in this case, a car. We assume that the primary
focus is from the perspective of GM. Then GM observes
their  current  state  and  its  context  by  estimating  the
percentage of buyers who choose GM cars, Toyota cars,
or other cars. GM proposes a plan to capture more of the
market  by  contending  with  internal  factors  such  as
structure, personnel, talent, and costs as well as external
factors  such  as  competitiveness,  markets,  price  and
technology leadership. The Markov transition matrix is
estimated.   Then GM implements its plan and estimates
the percentage of buyers who stay with GM or switch to
Toyota or others. As feedback is collected, the transition
matrix  is  updated  and  a  binomial  tree  is  built.  The
probability p of having correctly estimated the transition
matrix  and  the  probability  (1-p)  of  the  current  state
continuing unabated is determined (GM does not know
whether its plan will work, but the estimate of p that it
works means that a target progression of customers to
GM  occurs  according  to  the  transition  matrix).  Some
probability exists on the number of stages that GM passes
through on the way to a steady state until counterattacked
by  opponents  (even  if  GM’s  plan  is  successful,  some
number  of  steps/stages/time  periods  occur  before  the
market reaches steady state).   Toyota will not wait, but
will counterattack as soon as it can, possibly before the
market reaches a new steady state.   If so, then the new
market  status  will  either  be  the  ground  state  with
sufficient  time  or  some  intermediate  excited  state
depending on the number of stages completed before a
counterattack occurs). At the point of counterattack the
progress stage of percentages becomes the new current
state. The above steps will be simulated to estimate the
probability of success in reaching a minimally acceptable
new state for GM.
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